It is impracticable for the executive branch of government to be headed by anything other than a single person. Our Constitution created a strong presidency, and Jefferson feared that it might become an office for life. Jefferson's recommendation that the Constitution provide that the president be limited to two terms in office was not implemented until the ratification of the 22nd Amendment in 1951.
"[The people] are not qualified to exercise themselves the Executive department; but they are qualified to name the person who shall exercise it. With us, therefore, they choose this officer every four years." --Thomas Jefferson to Abbe Arnoux, 1789. Papers, 15:283
"The idea of separating the executive business of the confederacy from Congress, as the judiciary is already, in some degree, is just and necessary." --Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 1787. ME 6:131
"To obtain a wise and an able [State] government,... render the Executive a more desirable post to men of abilities by making it more independent of the legislature." --Thomas Jefferson to Archibald Stuart, 1791. ME 8:277
"Leave the President free to choose his own coadjutors, to pursue his own measures, and support him and them, even if we think we are wiser than they, honester than they are, or possessing more enlarged information of the state of things." --Thomas Jefferson to William Duane, 1811. ME 13:29
A Single Head
"Responsibility weighs with its heaviest force on a single head." --Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, 1816.
"Let the [State] Executive be chosen in the same way [as the Legislature] and for the same term, by those whose agent he is to be; and leave no screen of a Council behind which to skulk form responsibility." --Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, 1816.
"Responsibility is a tremendous engine in a free government. Let [the Executive] feel the whole weight of it then by taking away the shelter of his Executive Council. Experience both ways has established the superiority of this measure." --Thomas Jefferson to Archibald Stuart, 1791. ME 8:277
"The preference of a plural over a singular executive will probably not be assented to here." --Thomas Jefferson to A. L. C. Destutt de Tracy, 1811. ME 13:15
"I had formerly looked with great interest to the experiment which was going on in France of an Executive Directory, while that of a single elective executive was under trial here. I thought the issue of them might fairly decide the question between the two modes. But the untimely fate of that establishment cut short the experiment. I have not, however, been satisfied whether the dissensions of that Directory (and which I fear are incident to a plurality) were not the most effective cause of the successful usurpations which overthrew them. It is certainly one of the most interesting questions to a republican and worthy of great consideration." --Thomas Jefferson to Augustus B. Woodward, 1809. ME 12:283
"The experiment in France failed after a short course, and not from any circumstance peculiar to the times or nation, but from those internal jealousies and dissensions in the Directory, which will ever arise among men equal in power, without a principal to decide and control their differences." --Thomas Jefferson to A. L. C. Destutt de Tracy, 1811. ME 13:15
"If experience has ever taught a truth, it is that a plurality in the Supreme Executive will forever split in discordant factions, distract the nation, annihilate its energies and force the nation to rally under a single head, generally an usurper. We have, I think, fallen on the happiest of all modes of constituting the Executive, that of easing and aiding our President by permitting him to choose Secretaries of State, of Finance, of War and of the Navy with whom he may advise, either separately or all together, and remedy their divisions by adopting or controlling their opinions at his discretion; this saves the nation from the evils of a divided will and secures to it a steady march in the systematic course which the President may have adopted for that of his administration." --Thomas Jefferson to A. Coray, 1823.
"The public knew well the dissensions of the [first President's] Cabinet, but never had an uneasy thought on their account, because they knew also they had provided a regulating power which would keep the machine in steady movement." --Thomas Jefferson to A. L. C. Destutt de Tracy, 1811. ME 13:17
"The power of decision in the President left no object for internal dissension, and external intrigue was stifled in embryo by the knowledge which incendiaries possessed, that no division they could foment would change the course of the executive power." --Thomas Jefferson to A. L. C. Destutt de Tracy, 1811. ME 13:18
"The form of a plurality, however promising in theory, is impracticable with men constituted with the ordinary passions." --Thomas Jefferson to A. L. C. Destutt de Tracy, 1811. ME 13:16
"[That] plan [is] best, I believe, [which] combines wisdom and practicability by providing a plurality of counselors but a single Arbiter for ultimate decisions." --Thomas Jefferson: Autobiography, 1821.
"I think history furnishes as many examples of a single usurper arising out of a government by a plurality as of temporary trust of power in a single hand rendered permanent by usurpation. I do not believe, therefore, that this danger is lessened in the hands of a plural Executive. Perhaps it is greatly increased by the state of inefficiency to which they are liable from feuds and divisions among themselves." --Thomas Jefferson to A. L. C. Destutt de Tracy, 1811. ME 13:18
Executive Departments
"Our government, although in theory subject to be directed by the unadvised will of the President, is, and from its origin has been, a very different thing in practice. The minor business in each department is done by the Head of the department, on consultation with the President alone. But all matters of importance or difficulty are submitted to all the Heads of departments composing the cabinet; sometimes by the President's consulting them separately and successively, as they happen to call on him; but in the greatest cases, by calling them together, discussing the subject maturely, and finally taking the vote, in which the President counts himself but as one. So that in all important cases the executive is, in fact, a directory, which certainly the President might control; but of this there was never an example, either in the first or the present administration. I have heard, indeed, that my predecessor sometimes decided things against his council." --Thomas Jefferson to William Short, 1807. ME 11:226
"Aided by the counsels of a cabinet of heads of departments... with whom the President consults, either singly or altogether, he has the benefit of their wisdom and information, brings their views to one center, and produces an unity of action and direction in all the branches of the government... The power of decision in the President [leaves] no object for internal dissension, and external intrigue [is] stifled in embryo by the knowledge which incendiaries [possess] that no division they could foment would change the course of the executive power." --Thomas Jefferson to A. L. C. Destutt de Tracy, 1811.
"Consultation between the President and the head of the department to which the matter belonged... is the way everything is transacted which is not difficult as well as important." --Thomas Jefferson to William Wirt, 1811. ME 13:53
"The ordinary business of every day is done by consultation between the President and the Head of the department alone to which it belongs. For measures of importance or difficulty, a consultation is held with the Head of departments, either assembled, or by taking their opinions separately in conversation or in writing. The latter is most strictly in the spirit of the Constitution, because the President, on weighing the advice of all, is left free to make up an opinion for himself. In this way, they are not brought together, and it is not necessarily known to any what opinion the others have given. This was General Washington's practice for the first two or three years of his administration, till the affairs of France and England threatened to embroil us, and rendered consideration and discussion desirable." --Thomas Jefferson to Walter Jones, 1810. ME 12:371
"I practised this last method [i.e., assembled discussion], because the harmony was so cordial among us all, that we never failed, by a contribution of mutual views on the subject, to form an opinion acceptable to the whole. I think there never was one instance to the contrary, in any case of consequence. Yet this does, in fact, transform the executive into a directory, and I hold the other method to be more constitutional. It is better calculated, too, to prevent collision and irritation, and to cure it, or at least suppress its effects when it has already taken place." --Thomas Jefferson to Walter Jones, 1810.
"The fact is, that in ordinary affairs every head of a department consults me on those of his department, and where anything arises too difficult or important to be decided between us, the consultation becomes general." --Thomas Jefferson to William Duane, 1806. ME 11:96
"Something now occurs almost every day on which it is desirable to have the opinions of the Heads of departments, yet to have a formal meeting every day would consume so much of their time as to seriously obstruct their regular business. I have proposed to them, as most convenient for them and wasting less of their time, to call on me at any moment of the day which suits their separate convenience, when, besides any other business they may have to do, I can learn their opinions separately on any matter which has occurred, also communicate the information received daily." --Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, 1807. ME 11:267
"Acts involving war, or proceedings which respect foreign nations, seem to belong either to the department of war, or to that which is charged with the affairs of foreign nations; but I cannot possibly conceive how the superintendence of the laws of neutrality, or the preservation of our peace with foreign nations, can be ascribed to the department of the treasury, which I suppose to comprehend merely matters of revenue. It would be to add a new and a large field to a department already amply provided with business, patronage, and influence." --Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, 1793.
"Conduct it ever so wisely, [the management of the War Department] will be a sacrifice of [the person accepting it]. Were an angel from heaven to undertake that office, all our miscarriages would be ascribed to him." --Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 1815. ME 14:229
Executive Privilege
"[Do] not suppose that... official communications will ever be seen or known out of the offices. Reserve as to all their proceedings is the fundamental maxim of the Executive department." --Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Hawkins, 1800. ME 10:160
"The time is coming when our friends must enable us to hear everything, and expect us to say nothing; when we shall need all their confidence that everything is doing which can be done, and when our greatest praise shall be, that we appear to be doing nothing." --Thomas Jefferson to William Duane, 1807. ME 11:290
"It is essential for the public interest that I should receive all the information possible respecting either matters or persons connected with the public. To induce people to give this information, they must feel assured that when deposited with me it is secret and sacred. Honest men might justifiably withhold information, if they expected the communication would be made public, and commit them to war with their neighbors and friends. This imposes the duty on me of considering such information as mere suggestions for inquiry, and to put me on my guard; and to injure no man by forming any opinion until the suggestion be verified. Long experience in this school has by no means strengthened the disposition to believe too easily. On the contrary, it has begotten an incredulity which leaves no one's character in danger from any hasty conclusion." --Thomas Jefferson to John Smith, 1807. ME 11:203
"Reserving the necessary right of the President of the United States to decide, independently of all other authority, what papers, coming to him as President, the public interests permit to be communicated, and to whom, I assure you of my readiness under that restriction, voluntarily to furnish on all occasions, whatever the purposes of justice may require." --Thomas Jefferson to George Hay, 1807. ME 11:228
"I am persuaded the Court is sensible, that paramount duties to the nation at large control the obligation of compliance with their summons... at any place, other than the seat of government. To comply with such calls would leave the nation without an executive branch, whose agency, nevertheless, is understood to be so constantly necessary, that it is the sole branch which the Constitution requires to be always in function. It could not then mean that it should be withdrawn from its station by any co-ordinate authority." --Thomas Jefferson to George Hay, 1807. ME 11:232
"If the Constitution enjoins on a particular officer to be always engaged in a particular set of duties imposed on him, does not this supersede the general law subjecting him to minor duties inconsistent with these? The Constitution enjoins his constant agency in the concerns of six millions of people. Is the law paramount to this, which calls on him on behalf of a single one?" --Thomas Jefferson to George Hay, 1807. ME 11:240
"As I do not believe that the district courts have a power of commanding the executive government to abandon superior duties and attend on them, at whatever distance, I am unwilling, by any notice of the subpoena, to set a precedent which might sanction a proceeding so preposterous." --Thomas Jefferson to George Hay, 1807. ME 11:365
"With respect to papers, there is certainly a public and a private side to our offices. To the former belong grants of land, patents for inventions, certain commissions, proclamations, and other papers patent in their nature. To the other belong mere executive proceedings. All nations have found it necessary, that for the advantageous conduct of their affairs, some of these proceedings, at least, should remain known to their executive functionary only. He, of course, from the nature of the case, must be the sole judge of which of them the public interest will permit publication. Hence, under our Constitution, in requests of papers, from the legislative to the executive branch, an exception is carefully expressed, as to those which he may deem the public welfare may require not to be disclosed." --Thomas Jefferson to George Hay, 1807. ME 11:232
"The respect mutually due between the constituted authorities, in their official intercourse, as well as sincere dispositions to do for every one what is just, will always insure from the executive, in exercising the duty of discrimination confided to him, the same candor and integrity to which the nation has in like manner trusted in the disposal of its judiciary authorities." --Thomas Jefferson to George Hay, 1807. ME 11:233
The Office of Vice-President
"The second office of the government is honorable and easy, the first is but a splendid misery." --Thomas Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry, 1797. ME 9:381
"As to the second [office], it is the only office in the world about which I am unable to decide in my own mind whether I had rather have it or not have it. Pride does not enter into the estimate; for I think with the Romans that the general of today should be a soldier tomorrow if necessary." --Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 1997. ME 9:358
"As to duty, the Constitution will know [the Vice-President] only as a member of a legislative body; and its principle is, that of a separation of legislative, executive and judiciary functions, except in cases specified. If this principle be not expressed in direct terms, yet it is clearly the spirit of the Constitution, and it ought to be so commented and acted on by every friend to free government." --Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 1797. ME 9:368
"I consider my office [of Vice-President] as constitutionally confined to legislative functions, and... I could not take any part whatever in executive consultations, even were it proposed." --Thomas Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry, 1797. ME 9:383
Foreign Ministers
"After entering on the office of Secretary of State, I recommended to General Washington to establish as a rule of practice, that no person should be continued on foreign mission beyond an absence of six, seven, or eight years... We return like foreigners, and, like them, require a considerable residence here to become Americanized." --Thomas Jefferson to William Short, 1801. ME 10:285
The Powers of the Presidency
"As to the portions of power within each State assigned to the General Government, the President is as much the Executive of the State as their particular governor is in relation to State powers." --Thomas Jefferson to John M. Goodenow, 1822.
"The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary of each other, and none are more jealous of this than the Judiciary. But would the Executive be independent of the Judiciary if he were subject to the commands of the latter and to imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could bandy him from pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south and east to west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties? The intention of the Constitution that each branch should be independent of the others is further manifested by the means it has furnished to each to protect itself from enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and to none has it given more effectual or diversified means than to the Executive." --Thomas Jefferson to George Hay, 1807. ME 11:241
"Ingenuity ever should be exercised in devising constructions which may save to the public the benefit of the law. Its intention is the important thing: the means of attaining quite subordinate." --Thomas Jefferson to William H. Cabell, 1807.
"[We] are sensible that the Legislature having made stripes a regular part of [a] punishment, that the pardoning them cannot be a thing of course, as that would be to repeal the law, but that extraordinary and singular considerations are necessary to entitle the criminal to that remission." --Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, 1808.
"I shall be ready to receive and consider any testimony in [a criminal's] favor which his friends may bring forward, and will do it on whatever I may believe to have been the intention of the Legislature in confiding the power of pardon to the Executive." --Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, 1808.
"The Executive of the Union is, indeed, by the Constitution, made the channel of communication between foreign powers and the United States." --Thomas Jefferson to James Sullivan, 1807. ME 11:381
"The transaction of business with foreign nations is Executive altogether. It belongs, then, to the head of that department except as to such portions of it as are specially submitted to the Senate. Exceptions are to be construed strictly." --Thomas Jefferson: Opinion on Power of Senate, 1790.
"[If a] question... under [a] treaty [is] of Executive cognizance entirely and without appeal,... it is as much an invasion of its independence for a coordinate branch to call for the reasons of the decision as it would be to call on the Supreme Court for its reasons on any judiciary decision... I cannot see to what legitimate objects any resolution of the House on the subject can lead; and if one is passed on ground not legitimate, our duty will be to resist it." --Thomas Jefferson William Branch Giles, 1802.
"The President is bound to stop at the limits prescribed by our Constitution and law to the authorities in his hands, [and this] would apply in an occasion of peace as well as war. One of the limits is that 'no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law,' and [if] no law [has] made any appropriation of money for any purpose similar to [one contemplated, it would lie,] of course, beyond his constitutional powers." --Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 1806.
"The Executive... has the power, though not the right, to apply money contrary to its legal appropriations. Cases may be imagined, however, where it should be their duty to do this. But they must be cases of extreme necessity." --Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, 1793.
Presidential Elections
"I have ever considered the constitutional mode of election ultimately by the Legislature voting by States as the most dangerous blot in our Constitution, and one which some unlucky chance will some day hit and give us a pope and antipope." --Thomas Jefferson to George Hay, 1823.
"I apprehend that the total abandonment of the principle of rotation in the offices of President and Senator will end in abuse." --Thomas Jefferson to Edward Rutledge, 1788.
"I dislike, and strongly dislike... the abandonment in every instance of the principle of rotation in office and most particularly in the case of the President. Reason and experience tell us that the first magistrate will always be re-elected if he may be re-elected. He is then an officer for life. This once observed, it becomes of so much consequence to certain nations to have a friend or a foe at the head of our affairs that they will interfere with money and with arms. A Galloman or an Angloman will be supported by the nation he befriends. If once elected, and at a second or third election outvoted by one or two votes, he will pretend false votes, foul play, hold possession of the reins of government, be supported by the States voting for him, especially if they are the central ones lying in a compact body themselves and separating their opponents; and they will be aided by one nation of Europe while the majority are aided by another... It may be said that if elections are to be attended with these disorders, the less frequently they are repeated the better. But experience says that to free them from disorder, they must be rendered less interesting by a necessity of change. No foreign power, nor domestic party, will waste their blood and money to elect a person who must go out at the end of a short period. The power of removing every fourth year by the vote of the people is a power which will not be exercised, and if they were disposed to exercise it, they would not be permitted." --Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 1787. (Forrest version) ME 6:389
"What we have lately read, in the history of Holland, in the chapter on the Stadtholder, would have sufficed to set me against a chief magistrate, eligible for a long duration, if I had ever been disposed towards one; and what we have always read of the elections of Polish Kings should have forever excluded the idea of one continuable for life." --Thomas Jefferson to William S. Smith, 1787. ME 6:372
"[The] President seems a bad edition of a Polish King. He may be elected from four years to four years, for life. Reason and experience prove to us, that a chief magistrate, so continuable, is an office for life. When one or two generations shall have proved that this is an office for life, it becomes, on every occasion, worthy of intrigue, of bribery, of force, and even of foreign interference. It will be of great consequence to France and England to have America governed by a Galloman or Angloman. Once in office, and possessing the military force of the Union, without the aid or check of a council, he would not be easily dethroned, even if the people could be induced to withdraw their votes from him. I wish that at the end of the four years, they had made him forever ineligible a second time." --Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, 1787. ME 6:370
"The perpetual re-eligibility of the President... will be productive of cruel distress to our country... The importance to France and England, to have our government in the hands of a friend or foe, will occasion their interference by money, and even by arms. Our President will be of much more consequence to them than a King of Poland." --Thomas Jefferson to Alexander Donald, 1788. ME 6:426
"I own I should like better... that [the President] should be elected for seven years, and incapable for ever after." --Thomas Jefferson to William Short, 1788. ME 7:145
"My opinion originally was that the President of the United States should have been elected for seven years, and forever ineligible afterwards. I have since become sensible that seven years is too long to be irremovable, and that there should be a peaceable way of withdrawing a man in midway who is doing wrong. The service for eight years, with a power to remove at the end of the first four, comes nearly to my principle as corrected by experience." --Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor, 1805. ME 11:56
"I prefer the Presidential term of four years, to that of seven years, which I myself had at first suggested, annexing to it, however, ineligibility forever after; and I wish it were now annexed to the second quadrennial election of President." --Thomas Jefferson to James Martin, 1813. ME 13:381
"[Some] apprehend that a single Executive with eminence of talent and destitution of principle equal to the object might, by usurpation, render his powers hereditary." --Thomas Jefferson to A. L. C. Destutt de Tracy, 1811.
"If some period be not fixed, either by the Constitution or by practice, to the services of the First Magistrate, his office, though nominally elective, will in fact be for life; and that will soon degenerate into an inheritance." --Thomas Jefferson to Isaac Weaver, Jr., 1807. ME 11:220
"I am opposed to the monarchising [the federal Constitution's] features by the forms of its administration, with a view to conciliate a first transition to a President and Senate for life, and from that to an hereditary tenure of these offices, and thus to worm out the elective principle." --Thomas Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry, 1799. ME 10:77
"The danger is that the indulgence and attachments of the people will keep a man in the chair after he becomes a dotard, that reelection through life shall become habitual and election for life follow that." --Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor, 1805. ME 10:77
"[Some] suppose I am 'in the prime of life for rule.' I am sensible I am not [at age 65]; and before I am so far declined as to become insensible of it, I think it right to put it out of my own power." --Thomas Jefferson to Henry Guest, 1809.
"General Washington set the example of voluntary retirement after eight years. I shall follow it, and a few more precedents will oppose the obstacle of habit to anyone after a while who shall endeavor to extend his term. Perhaps it may beget a disposition to establish it by an amendment of the Constitution." --Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor, 1805. ME 11:57
"I had determined to declare my intention [not to extend my term], but I have consented to be silent on the opinion of friends, who think it best not to put a continuance out of my power in defiance of all circumstances. There is, however, but one circumstance which could engage my acquiescence in another election; to wit, such a division about a successor, as might bring in a monarchist. But that circumstance is impossible." --Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor, 1805. ME 11:57
"If the principle of rotation be a sound one, as I conscientiously believe it to be with respect to this office, no pretext should ever be permitted to dispense with it, because there never will be a time when real difficulties will not exist and furnish a plausible pretext for dispensation." --Thomas Jefferson to Henry Guest, 1809.
A Change of Administration
"If the will of the nation manifested by their various elections calls for an administration of government according with the opinions of those elected; if, for the fulfilment of that will, displacements are necessary, with whom can they begin [save] with persons appointed in the last administration? If a due participation of office is a matter or right, how are vacancies to be obtained? Those by death are few; by resignation, none. Can any other mode than that of removal be proposed? This is a painful office, but it is made [the executive's] duty, and [he must] meet it as such. [He must] proceed in the operation with deliberation and inquiry that it may injure the best men least and effect the purposes of justice and public utility with the least private distress; that it may be thrown as much as possible on delinquency, on oppression, on intolerance, on incompetence, on anti-revolutionary adherence to our enemies." --Thomas Jefferson to Elias Shipman, Jul 12, 1801. (*)
"If a [monocrat] be in office anywhere and it be known to the President, the oath he has taken to support the Constitution imperiously requires the instantaneous dismission of such officer; and I should hold the President criminal if he permitted such to remain. To appoint a [monocrat] to conduct the affairs of a republic is like appointing an atheist to the priesthood." --Thomas Jefferson: Newspaper letter, Jun 1803. (*)
"Our principles render [members of the opposition] in office safe if they do not employ their influence in opposing the government and only give their vote according to their conscience. And this principle we act on as well with those put in office by others as by ourselves." --Thomas Jefferson to Levi Lincoln, 1808. (*)
"Every officer of the government may vote at elections according to his conscience; but we should betray the cause committed to our care, were we to permit the influence of official patronage to be used to overthrow that cause." --Thomas Jefferson to Levi Lincoln, 1802. ME 10:340
"Opinion, and the just maintenance of it, shall never be a crime in my view: nor bring injury on the individual." --Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Adams, 1801. ME 10:251
"I believe with others, that deprivations of office, if made on the ground of political principles alone, would revolt our new converts, and give a body to leaders who now stand alone. Some, I know, must be made. They must be as few as possible, done gradually, and bottomed on some malversation or inherent disqualification." --Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 1801. ME 10:220
"Good men, to whom there is no objection but a difference of political principle, practised on only as far as the right of a private citizen will justify, are not proper subjects of removal, except in the case of attorneys and marshals. The courts being so decidedly federal and irremovable, it is believed that republican attorneys and marshals, being the doors of entrance into the courts, are indispensably necessary as a shield to the republican part of our fellow-citizens, which, I believe, is the main body of the people." --Thomas Jefferson to William B. Giles, 1801. ME 10:239
"The great stumbling block will be removals, which though made on those just principles only on which my predecessor ought to have removed the same persons, will nevertheless be ascribed to removal on party principles." --Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Rush, 1801. ME 10:242
"I still think our original idea as to office is best: that is, to depend, for the obtaining a just participation, on deaths, resignations, and delinquencies. This will least affect the tranquility of the people, and prevent their giving into the suggestion of our enemies, that ours has been a contest for office, not for principle." --Thomas Jefferson to Levi Lincoln, 1802. ME 10:339
"No man who has conducted himself according to his duties would have anything to fear from me, as those who have done ill would have nothing to hope, be their political principles what they might." --Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin S. Barton, 1801. ME 10:199
"The right of opinion shall suffer no invasion from me. Those who have acted well have nothing to fear, however they may have differed from me in opinion: those who have done ill, however, have nothing to hope; nor shall I fail to do justice lest it should be ascribed to that difference of opinion." --Thomas Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry, 1801. ME 10:254
"I think it not amiss that it should be known that we are determined to remove officers who are active or open-mouthed against the government, by which I mean the legislature as well as the executive." --Thomas Jefferson to Levi Lincoln, 1802. ME 10:340
"The patronage of public office should no longer be confided to one who uses it for active opposition to the national will." --Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, 1804. ME 11:26
"I have never removed a man merely because he was a federalist; I have never wished them to give a vote at an election, but according to their own wishes. But as no government could discharge its duties to the best advantage of its citizens, if its agents were in a regular course of thwarting instead of executing all its measures, and were employing the patronage and influence of their offices against the government and its measures, I have only requested they would be quiet, and they should be safe; that if their conscience urges them to take an active and zealous part in opposition, it ought also to urge them to retire from a post which they could not conscientiously conduct with fidelity to the trust reposed in them; and on failure to retire, I have removed them; that is to say, those who maintained an active and zealous opposition to the government." --Thomas Jefferson to John Page, 1807. ME 11:286
Termination of An Administration
"I have thought it right to take no part myself in proposing measures, the execution of which will devolve on my successor. I am therefore chiefly an unmeddling listener to what others say. On the same ground, I shall make no new appointments which can be deferred... thinking it fair to leave to my successor to select the agents for his own administration." --Thomas Jefferson to George Logan, 1808.
"I should not feel justified in directing measures which those who are to execute them would disapprove." --Thomas Jefferson to Levi Lincoln, 1808. ME 12:195
"[My predecessor in the office of the President made several] last appointments to office... [which] were among my most ardent political enemies, from whom no faithful cooperation could ever be expected, and laid me under the embarrassment of acting through men whose views were to defeat mine, or to encounter the odium of putting others in their places. It seems but common justice to leave a successor free to act by instruments of his own choice." --Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams, 1804. ME 11:29
"It would be with extreme reluctance that, so near the time of my own retirement, I should proceed to name any high officer, especially one who must be of the intimate councils of my successor, and who ought of course to be in his unreserved confidence." --Thomas Jefferson to Henry Dearborn, 1808. ME 12:64
The Executive Branch is responsible for the administration of everything listed under Government Policy in a Republic.
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